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MEASURING DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE 




A comprehensive examination of distributive injustice within the U.S. 
health care system should move well beyond quantitative measures of 
differences in the flow of finances to acquire health care services.  It requires a 
more concentrated emphasis on differences in health outcomes1 for lower- 
versus higher-income Americans and the key non-financial factors that produce 
them.2  Specifically, this article highlights the importance of education as a 
powerful contributor to significant differences in health outcomes.  Expanding 
our vision to capture factors—such as education—outside the narrow scope of 
conventional health care financing and delivery provides an opportunity to 
discover better targeted policy interventions to narrow the existing income 
inequality in overall health outcomes. 
Part II of this article explains the evidence that education may be a powerful 
driver of disparities in health outcomes.  Part III illustrates how a more limited 
distributional analysis of health-services spending in recent studies of the 
Medicare program has produced sharply conflicting conclusions on whether 
Medicare financing is regressive or progressive.3  Part IV then offers a possible 
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 1. The most basic measures of health outcomes involve changes in life expectancy and health 
status.  They may also extend beyond more detailed measures of mortality and morbidity in general, to 
include measures linked to specific health conditions or medical treatments (i.e., did the patient’s health 
get better or worse following a particular course of treatment for a particular medical condition?). 
 2. This article will not directly address a different theory of race-based disparities in health care, 
which emphasizes bias, prejudice, and discrimination within the doctor–patient relationship.  See 
UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian 
D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. Stith & Alan R. Nelson eds., 2002).  For a different view of the factors behind 
health disparities, see JONATHAN KLICK & SALLY SATEL, THE HEALTH DISPARITIES MYTH (2006). 
 3. The largest portion of Medicare expenditures—primarily for hospital care in the Hospital 
Insurance (“HI”), or Part A, portion of the program—is financed through a flat-rate payroll tax.  From 
the program’s inception in 1965 through 1990, the maximum amount of wages subject to the payroll tax 
for Medicare purposes was capped at the same level used for Social Security (old age, survivors, and 
disability insurance) financing.  The maximum tax base was indexed to rise each year in proportion to 
the annual increase in average wages.  In 1991, the maximum tax base for Medicare’s HI program was 
raised to $125,000 (from a level of $51,300 in 1990).  After the HI maximum tax base rose to $135,000 in 
1993, in line with annual wage-indexing adjustments, the cap on taxable earnings for Medicare purposes 
was removed, beginning in 1994.  The pre-1991 method to finance Medicare HI expenditures was 
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reconciliation of these studies by focusing on the differences in health outcomes 
that various types of Medicare beneficiaries experience, rather than on the 
levels of health care spending that they receive.  And finally, Part V builds on 
the preceding findings to suggest how policy interventions may be retargeted to 
be more effective in narrowing income-related gaps in health. 
II 
PREDICTING DISPARITIES IN HEALTH  
OUTCOMES: EDUCATION AS A KEY VARIABLE 
If the search for distributive injustice in health care is redirected from 
focusing on how much health care different parties receive (spending) to how 
well the overall health care system improves or maintains their health 
(outcomes), the role of socioeconomic variables other than income in producing 
different levels of health becomes more apparent.4 The importance of relative 
levels of educational attainment, in particular, comes to the forefront. 
A long line of empirical studies that helps to explain how variables other 
than access to, or consumption of, health care services have more power in 
predicting health outcomes (and health disparities) centers on the Grossman 
model of health care consumption.5  For purposes of examining health 
disparities and distributive-justice issues, the updated and condensed version 
provided below illustrates that health care is only one of many inputs into the 
health-production function; other nonmedical factors—such as exercise, 
nutrition, health-related behaviors, and social norms—account for much more 
of the variance in predicting health outcomes.  Hence, disparities in the 
consumption of health care itself, let alone the financing of health insurance, 
may have little effect on health disparities. 
 
“regressive” in the sense that workers who earned wages below the maximum tax base paid a higher 
percentage of their earnings as payroll taxes than workers with larger amounts of earnings above the 
tax cap.  The post-1993 system of “uncapped” payroll-tax financing for Medicare remains somewhat 
regressive in the sense that other sources of income generally received in greater amounts by higher 
income individuals—such as capital gains and dividend income—are not subject to the payroll tax 
imposed on wages.  Medicare’s other primary sources of financing apply to its Supplementary Medical 
Insurance program, or Part B.  Medicare Part B is financed through a combination of beneficiary 
premiums and general revenue, with the latter accounting for roughly seventy-five percent of Part B 
expenditures.  Since that program’s inception in 1965, Part B premiums were charged at the same 
amount for all beneficiaries, although setting higher Part B premiums for very high-income 
beneficiaries (income-related premiums) will begin in 2007. 
 4. One might even borrow for health care the Copernican metaphor recently used to sketch out a 
modernized view of antitrust policy, but in this case recognize that Copernican policy analysis should 
revolve around health outcomes rather than the Ptolemaic view centered on health spending inputs.  
See William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, A Copernican View of Health Care Antitrust, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (Autumn 2002). 
 5. For the model’s initial formulation, see Michael Grossman, On the Concept of Health Capital 
and the Demand for Health, 80 J. POL. ECON. 223 (1972); for a thorough summary of its evolution and 
updated application, see Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: Understanding 
Medicaid’s Failure, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 705 (2005). 
11__MILLER.DOC 3/7/2007  3:59 PM 
Autumn 2006] MEASURING DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE 233 
Grossman compares one’s health capital to a stock.6  What one initially 
inherits will depreciate with age, but it can be increased or maintained by 
investment choices.7  Investments in health may include such variables as 
medical-care utilization, diet, exercise, cigarette smoking, and alcohol 
consumption.8  Of particular note here, he finds that the quantity of health 
demanded may rise with education (years of schooling) because more-educated 
people are more-efficient producers of health.9  Grossman’s extensive review of 
the literature, as of 1997, concludes that one’s education level is the most 
important correlate of good health—more important than socioeconomic 
factors like occupation or income.10  Moreover, education may change tastes or 
time preferences in a manner that encourages future-oriented behavior and 
favors health relative to other commodities.11 
The Grossman model’s emphasis on the link between education levels and 
health outcomes is supported by the finding of Adriana Lleras-Muney that one 
additional year of education increases life expectancy at age thirty-five by 1.7 
years.12  She concludes that income returns to education substantially 
underestimate overall returns, which include non-monetary benefits such as 
better health.13 
One particular way in which increased levels of education improve health 
appears to be through preventing the onset of disease.  James Smith finds that 
additional schooling is strongly and statistically predictive of the onset of both 
major and minor diseases over an eight-year period for pre-retirees.14  On the 
other hand, financial measures such as household wealth and household income 
 
 6. Michael Grossman, The Human Capital Model, in 1A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 
347 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000). 
 7. Id. at 350. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 396.  Grossman suggests that there are two forms of such efficiency.  First, more-educated 
people demonstrate productive efficiency by obtaining a larger health outcome (“outputs”) from given 
amounts of the health services (“inputs”) they choose.  Second, schooling increases and improves 
information about the true effects of the inputs on health (for example, smoking or diet) and the better 
allocative efficiency of more-educated people will improve their health to the extent it leads to the 
selection of a better mix of health inputs.  More-educated people are likely to respond more rapidly 
when new information about the effects of health care inputs becomes available.  Id. at 396–97. 
 10. Id. at 395–97. 
 11. Id. at 397–404.  See also Michael Grossman & Robert Kaestner, Effects of Education on Health, 
in THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF EDUCATION 69 (Jere R. Behrman & Nevzer Stacey eds., 1997).  In other 
words, more-educated people not only use the health care system more effectively, they also demand 
more from it.  Their returns from additional “investments” in health care are more valuable to them in 
terms of their time preferences and opportunity costs. 
 12. Adriana Lleras-Muney, The Relationship Between Education and Adult Mortality in the United 
States, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 189, 215 (2005). 
 13. Id.  Although her study is limited to analyzing the effects of increasing education from 
relatively low initial levels through compulsory education laws, Lleras-Muney notes “that the benefits 
of education are large enough to consider education policies more seriously as a means to increase 
health, especially in light of the fact that other factors, such as expenditures on health, have not proven 
to be very effective.”  Id. 
 14. James P. Smith, Consequences and Predictors of New Health Events, in ANALYSES IN THE 
ECONOMICS OF AGING 213, 230–31 (David A. Wise ed., 2005). 
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(different measures of socioeconomic status), or even having health insurance, 
do not appear to predict (or prevent) disease onset.15 
A more intriguing component of the education–health connection involves 
mixed evidence that higher levels of education may increase the diffusion rate 
of innovative health technology, but in a manner that could worsen health 
inequality.16  Sherry Glied and Lleras-Muney find that more-educated people 
appear to benefit more from the development of new health care technologies.17  
More-educated people are better informed about medical innovation, have a 
more positive view of its risks and benefits, and search more effectively among 
providers varying in quality and practice patterns.18  Although education 
increases the overall technological diffusion rate, the lagged pattern of adoption 
in an era of accelerating technological innovation can generate ever-widening 
gradients in overall health.19 
Dana Goldman and Darius Lakdawalla also suggest that technological 
progress in health care—and increased government subsidies for research to 
accelerate it—may worsen health inequality over time.20  They distinguish 
between technological change that involves more investments of one’s own time 
and those that make time inputs less productive.21  They observe that more-
educated patients will devote relatively more resources to managing their own 
health, rather than having it managed, and therefore prefer “own time” 
technological change to “time-saving” technologies.22  The likely implications of 
these effects are that economy-wide growth in levels of education may 
encourage more technological change involving patient-intensive, own-time 
investments.23  Although new health care technologies, such as vaccines, that 
supplant time investments can reduce health disparities, such “[t]imesaving 
technologies may be more likely to arise when large numbers of uneducated 
people suffer from a disease” and “less likely when a disease is confined to the 
educated or the rich.”24  Goldman and Lakdawalla thus expect people with 
chronic, but treatable, conditions to exhibit greater health disparities.25  
Accordingly, prevention of treatable conditions is more effective than 
prevention of untreatable disease in reducing health inequality.26 
 
 15. Id. at 230. 
 16. See Sherry Glied & Adriana Lleras-Muney, Health Inequality, Education and Medical 
Innovation 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9738, 2003). 
 17. Id. at 22. 
 18. Id. at 22–23. 
 19. See id. at 24. 
 20. Dana Goldman & Darius Lakdawalla, Understanding Health Disparities Across Education 
Groups 5–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8328, 2001). 
 21. Id. at 5. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. at 37. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. at 36–37 ( “[T]he advent of a chronic, treatable illness will tend to widen health 
disparities, while the advent of an untreatable illness will contract them.”).  These still somewhat-
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Recent evidence is more mixed concerning the possible effects of education 
in improving patient compliance with effective health-treatment regimes and 
enhancing self-management of care.  Goldman and Smith found that better self-
management of disease by the more-educated was a critical factor in 
maintaining the socioeconomic-status health gradient for diabetes and HIV.27  
However, those examples of educational differences combining with newer 
medical technologies to exacerbate already large differences in health based on 
socioeconomic status may be limited to certain diseases and treatments.  More 
recent work by Goldman and Smith, involving ACE inhibitors and calcium 
channel blockers used to treat hypertension, found no evidence that “diffusion 
of these drugs into medical treatment favored one education group relative to 
another.”28  On the other hand, Anne Case, Ingrid le Roux, and Alicia 
Menendez discerned more of a patient-compliance effect than a diffusion effect, 
and, in the case of hypertension medication, this was tied to household income, 
rather than to education.29 
The weight of the limited early evidence suggests that levels of education 
strongly influence the health outcomes produced by most, if not all, newer 
health care services (particularly those rewarding greater investments of one’s 
own time) and that those effects appear to stem from a combination of greater 
technological diffusion and better compliance among better-educated patients. 
III 
THE PROGRESSIVITY OF MEDICARE 
The Medicare program should offer a promising venue for measurement of 
distributive justice within the U.S. health care system.  As an age-based 
entitlement program, Medicare on its face appears to offer essentially the same 
health benefits to almost all Americans sixty-five years and older, while its 
financing through payroll taxes and income taxes suggests at least some 
redistribution from high-income households to low-income households.30  
However, recent studies examining the relative progressivity of Medicare’s 
structure for financing and benefits delivery, in terms of intragenerational 
fairness, initially appear to point in several directions. 
 
speculative projections appear to dovetail with existing concerns about recent trends in pharmaceutical 
research to concentrate more on developing higher-margin, “lifestyle” drugs aimed at the concerns of 
more-affluent and presumably better-educated consumers.  Admittedly, such business strategies may 
also be aimed in part at avoiding dealing with those broad-based health conditions most likely to attract 
greater price regulation and political scrutiny in the future. 
 27. Dana P. Goldman & James P. Smith, Can Patient Self-Management Help Explain the SES 
Health Gradient?, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 10929, 10934 (2002). 
 28. Dana P. Goldman & James P. Smith, Socioeconomic Differences in the Adoption of New 
Medical Technologies 6  (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11218, 2005). 
 29. Anne Case, Ingrid le Roux & Alicia Menendez, Medical Compliance and Income-Health 
Gradients, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 331, 334 (2004). 
 30. Moreover, unlike competing brands of private health insurance with smaller market shares, 
Medicare provides a rich and comprehensive database to researchers that allows them to examine the 
flow of taxes paid and health benefits received over time for various cohorts of beneficiaries. 
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At one end of the spectrum, Mark McClellan and Jonathan Skinner initially 
have suggested that Medicare’s combination of tax payments and program 
spending actually leads to net transfers from the poor to the wealthy,31 but the 
evidence for that conclusion is mixed at best.  In their examination of Medicare 
progressivity in 1997, McClellan and Skinner emphasize the system’s relatively 
regressive payroll-tax financing mechanisms and the longer survival times, and 
higher spending levels, of wealthier beneficiaries.32  They find a net flow of 
benefits from low-income to higher-income individuals in the cohorts that had 
reached Medicare eligibility to date (as of 1990).33  However, they acknowledge 
that if one takes into account the “insurance” value of Medicare, beyond its 
mere value as a cash-transfer mechanism, there is, on net, “faint redistribution 
from the highest income deciles to the lowest income deciles.”34 
In a subsequent paper, Julia Lee, McClellan, and Skinner identify “a 
dramatic change in the pattern of Medicare spending between 1990 and 1995,” 
which they claim “represents an increased redistributional role for Medicare.”35  
Specifically, they find Medicare spending per capita in the lowest-income 
neighborhoods grew much more rapidly (forty-three percent) than Medicare 
spending for beneficiaries in high-income neighborhoods (sixteen percent).36  
However, this increased redistribution role for Medicare, moving toward rough 
neutrality in dollar flows, was due in large part to changes in home health care 
spending that were of more questionable value.37 
More recently, Jay Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla calculate that the financial 
returns to Medicare are actually much higher for poorer groups in the 
population than previously believed, and hence Medicare is a highly progressive 
 
 31. See Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of Medicare 1, 47 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6013, 1997).  In the latest version of that work, they still conclude 
that, at least in dollar terms, “the highest income households received net benefits (i.e., lifetime 
expenditures less lifetime taxes) slightly higher than those in lower income groups.”  Mark McClellan & 
Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of Medicare, 90 J. Pub. Econ 257, 258 (2006). McClellan and Skinner 
calculate lifetime expenditures for the elderly in Medicare by residential ZIP code deciles.  They use 
comprehensive Part A and Part B insurance claims data from a cohort of 1.3 million Medicare enrollees 
for the years 1987–2001.  The authors use another survey, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, to 
track entire accumulated Medicare payments since 1967 for representative individuals.  Their analysis 
makes inferences about high- and low-income neighborhoods rather than high- or low-income 
households.  McClellan and Skinner also estimate the insurance value of Medicare by using a simple 
analytic program to measure the money-metric value of the ex ante benefits that the program provides. 
 32. See McClellan & Skinner (1997), supra note 31, at 2. 
 33. Id. at 47. After McClellan and Skinner account for the effects of later financing reforms in the 
early 1990s (removing the cap on wage-based earnings subject to the Medicare share of the payroll tax), 
which do increase progressivity for more recent cohorts of Medicare beneficiaries, their 1997 analysis 
nevertheless projects that net transfers will still flow from the lower- to higher-income beneficiaries  
(except for the very lowest- and highest-income groups) after the first wave of Baby Boomers begins to 
reach age sixty-five in 2010.  Id. at 4. 
 34. Id.  See also McClellan & Skinner (2006), supra note 31, at 258. 
 35. Julia Lee, Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Distributional Effects of Medicare, 13 TAX 
POL’Y & ECON. 85, 86–87 (1999). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 100–02. 
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public program.38  By using educational attainment as a measure of permanent 
income and socioeconomic status, they find that the poorest groups receive the 
most benefits at any given age, and the advantage of the poor in benefit receipt 
is in fact so great that it easily overcomes their higher death rates.39 
Finally, Skinner and Weiping Zhou observe that the answer regarding 
Medicare progressivity depends primarily on the question asked.40  They 
conclude that when inequality is measured by Medicare expenditures, health 
care for the elderly became more equitable during the past several decades.41  
However, the rapid relative growth in health spending among low-income 
elderly people has not translated into relative improvement either in survival or 
rates of effective care.42 
IV 
HEALTH OUTCOMES, NOT HEALTH INPUTS 
The apparent conflicts within the above studies become less significant once 
relative health outcomes are adopted as the more relevant measure of 
disparities within the Medicare beneficiary population.  Moreover, educational 
level should be accounted for as a particularly powerful socioeconomic factor 
behind differences in both the use of health services and the overall health 
status of Medicare households. 
For example, the study by McClellan and Skinner uses ZIP-code-level 
census information to measure the variation in Medicare beneficiaries’ 
incomes.43  This produces a rough correlation between Medicare expenditures 
 
 38. Jay Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Does Medicare Benefit the Poor?, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 
277, 278 (2006).  In the study, they correct for aggregation bias in previous measures of socioeconomic 
status based on geography—as done in the McClellan and Skinner study—and instead use individual-
level educational attainment.  Id. 
 39. See id. at 282, tbl.1. 
 40. See Jonathan Skinner & Weiping Zhou, The Measurement and Evolution of Health Inequality: 
Evidence from the U.S. Medicare Population, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION 288, 
306 (Alan J. Auerbach et al. eds., 2006). 
 41. Id. at 296.  Skinner and Zhou used a five-percent sample of Medicare enrollees, the Continuous 
Medicare History Survey, to determine trends in Medicare spending by income decile.  They used 
median ZIP-code income from the 1990 U.S. Census, assigning it to each individual in the Medicare file 
based on their mailing address ZIP code.  They calculate that during 1987–2001, low-income 
households experienced an increase of seventy-eight percent in per capita Medicare expenditures, 
double the increase of thirty-four percent in the highest income group.  Id. at 295–96. 
 42. Id. at 307.  To determine the distribution of survival gains by income deciles within the 
Medicare population, Skinner and Zhou considered two different cohorts from the Continuous 
Medicare History Survey.  They began with the group of people (age 65–69 and age 75–79) alive in 
1982, and followed up with the corresponding group alive at those same ages in 1992.  Skinner and 
Zhou find that while all groups gained in terms of survival probabilities, the highest income groups 
gained the most, both in percentage and in absolute terms.  For their other estimates of inequality in 
the provision of effective care in Medicare, Skinner and Zhou use samples of Medicare claims data for 
mammography rates and for rates of screening for eye examinations among patients with diabetes.  
They also derive measures of effective care for heart-attack patients covered by Medicare from the 
Cooperative Cardiovascular Project survey of acute-myocardial-infarction patients over age sixty-five 
in 1994/1995.  Id. at 301–06. 
 43. McClellan & Skinner (2006), supra note 31, at 261. 
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Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla use a different measure of socioeconomic 
status to reach strikingly different conclusions about the relative progressivity 
of Medicare.52  They explain that the apparent relationship between richer areas 
and greater aggregate levels of Medicare spending overlooked evidence of 
geographic mobility by elderly people.53  More specifically, they note that 
elderly people moving to richer ZIP codes, with presumably higher quality 
medical facilities, tended to increase their total medical spending, while those 
moving to poorer areas reduced spending.54  Therefore, they replace the 
geographically aggregated measure of neighborhood income and instead use 
individual educational attainment as a more reliable proxy for differences in 
permanent income among Medicare beneficiaries.55 
Their analysis concludes that, at any given age, Medicare spends far more on 
the poor (less educated) than on the rich (more educated).56  Part of the 
negative gradient in Medicare spending relative to educational attainment is 
explained by differences in observed health status.57  Indeed, they find less-
educated people cost Medicare more because they are sicker.58 
However, somewhat obscured within their study’s findings are two other 
observations pointing in the opposite direction.  First, adjusting for longevity 
and accounting for Medicare-benefit growth on a lifetime basis, rather than 
measuring at a given point in time, favors more educated groups because of 
their greater longevity.59  Second, there is a positive gradient in privately 
financed medical expenditures (more education leads to greater spending), once 
one controls for health status.60 
Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla raise some interesting points tentatively 
indicating at least somewhat greater progressivity in the financing and receipt of 
Medicare benefits.  Nevertheless, they do not fully resolve whether educational 
attainment may have stronger effects on Medicare spending levels than a purer 
proxy measure for income differences alone would cause.  Their measure of 
Medicare progressivity also remains limited to differences in the dollar amounts 
of benefits received, rather than disparities in the health outcomes they may, at 
least in part, help produce. 
 
 52. Bhattacharya & Lakdawalla, supra note 38, at 279. 
 53. Id. at 288–89. 
 54. Id. at 289. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 290 (“Our results suggest that Medicare is financially progressive, by a large margin, 
when permanent income is measured using individual education.”). 
 57. Id. at 282. 
 58. See id. (explaining that much of the negative gradient is due to “differences in observed health 
status.  Including self-reported occurrence of diseases and disability . . . erases more than half of the 
gradient between high school dropouts and college graduates.”). 
 59. Id. at 283. 
 60. Id. at 282.  Although Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla only allude to this finding in passing, the 
likely explanation is that private insurance is prone to greater variation in depth and scope of coverage, 
which in turn is linked in part to an individual’s level of income or education. 
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The better, if not final, word—at least for the moment—is suggested by the 
work of Skinner and Zhou.  It draws the appropriate distinction between 
inequality in spending and inequality in health outcomes.61  The dramatic 
increases they observed in relative Medicare expenditures for low-income 
neighborhoods during the past several decades did not translate into relative 
improvement in health outcomes for low-income elderly people, measured 
either in terms of ten-year survival rates or rates of effective care.62  Skinner and 
Zhou point out that relative levels of health expenditures depend on 
preferences, health status, and prices.63  On the other hand, health outcomes are 
strongly influenced by health behavior, diet, and life-course events (such as past 
illness) that extend beyond the health care system alone.64  Because the 
behavioral factors contributing to differences in health outcomes are also 
associated with income and socioeconomic status, inequalities in health can 
“reflect the wider inequalities in society.”65 
Drawing the lines of causation for health disparities remains an imprecise 
process, regardless of whether one uses measures of differences in income, 
broader  socioeconomic status, education, or intelligence to explain health 
disparities or instead simply relies on cruder differentials in health services 
received by various types of people.66  In any case, Skinner and Zhou advise 
caution in attributing all dollar increases in Medicare spending “to the people 
who nominally ‘receive’ the benefit.”67  For example, they question whether the 
substantial spike in “inappropriate” home health care spending in the late 
1990s, concentrated largely in the poorest ZIP codes of the United States, 
actually benefited low-income patients.68  They conclude that measuring 
inequality on the basis of health outcomes avoids the problem of inferring the 
effectiveness of health care expenditures and might lead policymakers to focus 
on more reasonable approaches to improve what matters most—the delivery of 
“effective” care to lower-income patients.69 
 
 61. Skinner & Zhou, supra note 40, at 291. 
 62. Id. at 298–306. 
 63. Id. at 289. 
 64. Id. at 292–93. 
 65. Id. at 293 (quoting JULIAN LAGRAND, THE STRATEGY OF EQUALITY 45 (1982)). 
 66. See e.g., Linda S. Gottfredson, Intelligence: Is It the Epidemiologists’ Elusive “Fundamental 
Cause” of Social Class Inequalities in Health?, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 174 (2004) 
(discussing the influence of a “general intelligence factor” on health status); Catherine E. Ross & John 
Mirowsky, Does Medical Insurance Contribute to Socioeconomic Differentials in Health?, 78 MILBANK 
Q. 291 (2000) (analyzing whether access to insurance helps to explain prior results showing better 
health outcomes for higher socioeconomic groups); Theodore Pincus et al., Social Conditions and Self-
Management Are More Powerful Determinants of Health Than Access to Care, 129 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 406 (1998) (arguing “limited access to medical services is not the primary basis for socioeconomic 
disparities in health;” instead the primary determinants of these disparities relate to the “sociocultural 
context” of the patient). 
 67. Skinner & Zhou, supra note 40, at 298. 
 68. Id. at 297–98. 
 69. Id. at 292, 308. 
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V 
RETARGETING POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
Given the comparative ease of tracking dollar flows instead of the multiple 
causes of health outcomes, it is not surprising that observers tend to look for the 
missing keys to health inequalities under the bright light of health services 
spending distribution. However, health care consumers are ultimately seeking 
better health, not just more health care.  Hence, a more telling measure of 
distributive justice for them would focus not on how much is spent on their 
behalf, or even how much they receive as health care services, but on how much 
any resulting improvements in their health status are worth.  Retargeting policy 
interventions to reduce disparities in health outcomes, even as measured along 
household-income lines, could provide new opportunities to raise the health 
status for lower-income Americans without foreclosing opportunities to seek 
even greater tiers of health enhancements—for those more willing and able to 
pay for them. 
As one moves from a narrow concentration on equalizing financial flows for 
the purchase of health services for lower-income consumers to improving the 
efficiency of those consumers in producing better health, the menu of less 
conventional, but potentially more cost-effective, policy options expands. 
The first option is not just investing more funds in education, but doing so 
more wisely.  Although levels of educational attainment are generally measured 
in terms of years of formal schooling, one should not fall into the statistical trap 
of confusing crude quantitative measures with somewhat more predictive 
qualitative measures.  The value of one’s education can vary beyond the 
number of years of schooling and reflect the particular institution at which one 
is educated as well as the curriculum that one studies.  Moreover, there is at 
best only a limited correlation between the amount of money spent to educate 
an individual (inputs) and the educational results achieved (outputs).  Given the 
wide variation in the current quality of education delivered in different public 
schools that primarily rely on conventional public financing and more 
centralized decisionmaking through governmental channels, increased use of 
vouchers placed in the hands of parents might enhance educational choice and 
competition and thereby improve the quality of education received.70 
Second, policymakers should deregulate the delivery and financing of 
medical services to provide patients with more options that offer them greater 
control over their own care.  Deregulation of the medical-delivery side should 
focus on reducing barriers to entry.  Excessive professional licensing 
restrictions, steep regulatory compliance burdens, and prolonged approval 
processes for innovative products all tend to favor entrenched incumbents at 
 
 70. The same policy lessons, of course, could be applied to the delivery and financing of health 
services.  Simply throwing more dollars in the same direction and manner at longstanding problems of 
poor performance and disappointing results is unlikely to achieve significant improvement in either  
health policy or education policy. 
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the expense of new competitors and their potential customers.  One promising 
opportunity for deregulation of health-insurance products could involve 
“competitive federalism,” in which state insurance regulators would be free to 
compete across state boundary lines in sponsoring different “brands” of 
insurance regulation that could be purchased by consumers in other states.71 
Choice and competition on the demand side of the market for health care 
should begin with further changes in the tax treatment of health-insurance 
purchasing to ensure a more level playing field for all purchasers (including 
individuals).  Although one can achieve a more level playing field by “leveling 
up” (as by adding new tax advantages for out-of-pocket health spending), in 
general it would be better to “level down” (as by providing fewer tax 
advantages for health care spending through insurance) in order to reduce 
distortions in how individuals weigh the value of health care spending against 
the value of other ways to improve their health or overall well-being. 
Third, policymakers should expand counseling support to encourage more 
farsighted and future-oriented health behavior.  The best opportunities for 
investments to further this objective remain within the educational system at 
younger ages, but they could be supplemented through greater outreach in 
assisting older adults as well.  Tax policy changes in the financing of health care, 
such as further liberalization and expansion of health savings accounts, also 
could increase financial incentives for health consumers to expand their time 
horizon in assessing more carefully the relative long-term value of the decisions 
they make regarding when, and how, they invest in their future health. 
The fourth option is to offer more navigational assistance for consumers 
maneuvering through our complex health care system.  Recent experience in 
implementing the new prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries 
underscores the often-overlooked importance of personalized assistance for 
consumers bewildered by the potentially daunting set of decisions they must 
face within a system in which opaqueness rather than transparency remains the 
operating rule of the road.  Improving health information for consumers needs 
to go well beyond bundled choices of insurance products to include greater 
transparency in the cost and quality, and, most of all, the value of health care 
options (which may involve choice of medical provider, product, or treatment) 
at the point of service. Public and private spending aimed at improving health 
could be better directed toward more support for campaigns to disseminate 
useful health information and for better integration of health care with 
supportive nonmedical resources. 
Finally, greater focus on improving our financial investments in better 
health care services is not enough.  We also must renew and expand efforts 
 
 71. To illustrate the case for a more dynamic version of competitive federalism that goes well 
beyond simply authorizing the alternative of federally certified nationwide health insurance, see Tom 
Miller, “Improving Access to Health Care without Comprehensive Health Insurance Coverage,” in 2 
COVERING AMERICA: REAL REMEDIES FOR THE UNINSURED 39, 48–51 (E.K. Wicks & J.A. Meyer  
eds., 2002), available at http://www.esresearch.org/Documents/CovAm2pdfs/CovAm2all.pdf.   
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within our broader culture to influence social norms to alter customs and social 
pressures that restrain improvement in health behavior.72 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Greater transparency in health care financing and more skepticism 
regarding the purported rationales for hidden cross-subsidies and regulatory 
protections are certainly overdue.  Indeed, the connection between reduced 
access to health care services for certain populations and poorer health 
outcomes for them may be overwhelmed by larger and more pervasive 
problems in delivery of medically appropriate care throughout the U.S. health 
care system.  Despite the steadily increasing bills we face for our nation’s health 
care services, recent research by the RAND corporation alarmingly suggests 
that almost half of standard health care procedures are not provided when 
clinically indicated.73 
These may be such issues, though, about which former president Dwight 
Eisenhower advised, “If a problem cannot be solved, enlarge it.”  Hence, the 
distributive-injustice discussion must move beyond simple consideration of 
increased health-services spending to a broader consideration of the 
mechanisms that promote healthy behavior that thus might obviate the need for 
medical care later in life.  Such consideration could open policy roads not yet 
taken, but rich with distributive-justice potential.  In particular, enhancing 
educational opportunities for lower-income Americans may help to ensure that 
not only no child, but also no patient, is left behind. 
 
 72. For an even broader exploration of the psychosocial variables that influence health outcomes 
and opportunities to improve them, see Richman, supra note 5, at 722–61. 
 73. Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Steven M. Asch, John Adams, Joan Keesey, Jennifer Hicks, Alison 
DeCristofaro & Eve A. Kerr, The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States,  348 
N. Eng. J. Med. 2635, 2643 (2003).  More recently, a similar team of researchers concluded that “[t]he 
differences among sociodemographic subgroups in the observed quality of health care are small in 
comparison with the gap for each subgroup between observed and desirable quality of health care.”  
Steven M. Asch, Eve A. Kerr, Joan Keesey, John L. Adams, Claude M. Setodji, Shaista Malik & 
Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Who Is at Greatest Risk for Receiving Poor-Quality Health Care? 354  N. Eng. J. 
Med 1147, 1147 (2006).  Its analysis cautions that health care “[q]uality-improvement programs that 
focus solely on reducing disparities among sociodemographic subgroups may miss larger opportunities 
to improve care.”  Id. 
